The design of environmental policy schemes is of extreme importance to achieve environmental goals in the most economically efficient way. Such policies may include voluntary schemes, regulation and market-based approaches intended to achieve a reduction in nutrient runoff from farms, air pollution, and habitat fragmentation on agricultural landscapes. Advances in mechanism design using economic theory, experimental economics and simulation techniques can provide valuable insights into the cost-effectiveness of policies.
As part of the Eco-delivery Project, the University of Stirling organized the international workshop “Mechanism Design and the Environment,” 8-9 May 2013 at the Royal Society of Edinburgh, providing a platform for environmental economists, policymakers and conservation practitioners to discuss the latest developments in this field.
The programme and list of participants can be accessed here and the presentations of all speakers are available below.
- Jason Shogren –Tradable set-aside requirements (TSARs): Conserving spatially dependent environmental amenities
- Frank Wätzold – Designing cost-effective payment schemes for grassland conservation measures
- Martin Drechsler – The role of landowner behaviour in agglomeration payments for biodiversity conservation
- Nick Hanley – The agglomeration bonus and spatial coordination failure in local networks: Implications for ecosystem services delivery
- Laure Kuhfuss – Collective incentives: What design for agri-environmental contracts?
- Ernst-August Nuppenau – Making the principal agent nexus applicable to nature provision by farmers: On information, mechanism design and transaction costs
- Margrethe Aanesen – The implications of including new stakeholders in fisheries management
- Estelle Midler – Compensations to curb deforestation and environmental merit
- Yohei Mitani – Designing a voluntary mechanism for efficient private forest conservation
- Tim Cason – Experimental Testbedding Market Mechanisms for Environmental Policy Design
- Antti Iho – Agri-environmental auctions for phosphorus load reduction: Experience from the Finnish pilot
- Prasenjit Banerjee – Bidding behavior given point and interval values in a second-price auction
- Hamet Sarr – Costly communication and the efficiency of the average Pigouvian tax: An experimental study
- Jakob Neitzel – Normative conflict and cooperation in sequential social choice dilemmas
- Ronggang Cong – Managing ecosystem services for agriculture: Will cooperation among farmers pay?
- William Shobe – Design Matters: Experimental Tests of California’s Cap and Trade Design
- Ian Lange – Permit allocation design and incentives for banking: Evidence from the Nitrogen Oxides Budget Program